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Abstract
This  paper  discusses  von  Wright's  theory  of  causation  from
Explanation  and Understanding and  Causality  and Determinism in
contemporary context. I argue that there are two important common
points  that  von  Wright's  view  shares  with  the  version  of
manipulability  currently  supported  by  Woodward:  the  analysis  of
causal relations in a system modelled on controlled experiments, and
the explanation of manipulability through counterfactuals - with focus
on the counterfactual account of unmanipulable causes. These points
also mark von Wright's departure from previous action-based theories
of  causation.  Owing  to  these  two  features,  I  argue  that,  upon
classifying different versions of manipulability theories, von Wright's
view should be placed closer to the interventionist approach than to
the agency theory, where it currently stands. Furthermore, given its
relevance in contemporary context, which this paper aims to establish,
I claim that von Wright's theory can be employed to solve present
problems connected to manipulability approaches to causation. 
This paper provides a reassessment of Von Wright's views on causation in the context of
contemporary  manipulability  theories.  Currently,  manipulability-based  approaches  to  causation
have been gaining wide acceptance, particularly in the philosophy of science, while earlier accounts
such as the ones by Collingwood, Gasking, and von Wright are acknowledged as precursors, owing
their focus on the connection between causation and action. In my view, there are two aspects that
deserve further emphasis when reading von Wright alongside present manipulability theories: the
connection between causation and experimentation, and the counterfactual framework for defining
causation through action, particularly the subsequent solution to the issue of unmanipulable causes.
Regarding  the  former,  I  argue  that  in  the  context  of  early  manipulability-based  approaches  to
causality,  von  Wright  is  the  first  to  connect  causation  understood  as  manipulability  to
experimentation.  His  further  considerations  can  be  linked  to  the  methodology  of  controlled
experiments. This point renders von Wright's view significant in contemporary perspective, where
experimentation  and  methodology  play  an  important  role  in  the  debates  around  causality.
Concerning the latter, I argue that the reliance on counterfactuals to explain manipulability, and to
further account for unmanipuable causes, currently advocated by Woodward, can be traced to von
Wright's  work (as early as  Explanation and Understanding,  but more overtly  in  Causality  and
Determinism).
In what follows I propose a different mapping of von Wright's view in relation to both early
and present  developments  of  manipulability-based views.  Consequently,  I  present  von Wright's
approach in connection to the general framework of manipulability theories (section 1), then discuss
von  Wright's  views  alongside  Woodward's  on  causation  and  experimentation  (section  2),  and
counterfactuals and unmanipulable causes (section 3). I further explain why these features of von
Wright’s approach have seemingly gone unnoticed thus far in the light of the requirements  for
theories on the metaphysics and epistemology of causation of the time (section 4).
1. Von Wright's theory as an early attempt to define causation as manipulability
On a very general formulation, a manipulability approach to causation holds that there is a causal
connection between two relata (say, p causes q), if intervening, or acting to change p yields into
corresponding changes in q. While there are several issues with defining causation or providing an
account of causal explanation through manipulation, one pressing problem concerns unmanipulable
causes.  On this  definition,  the  possibility  of  changing the  effect  variable  seems  to  rest  on  the
capacity of an agent to perform certain actions. Since there are cases where it is impossible for
agents  to  intervene  on causal  relations  (say,  one  cannot  intervene  on magmatic  activity  to  see
whether it has a causal influence on volcanic eruptions), approaches of this form need to explain
how the connection between causation and manipulability holds for such examples. In the causation
literature  (Woodward,  2003,  2016)  this  is  stated  as  one  of  the  main  issues  to  have  prevented
manipulability approaches from gaining wider acceptance earlier on. I discuss specific solutions to
this problem by von Wright and Woodward in section 3.
With regard to specific formulations of manipulability, von Wright's view goes as follows:
‘it is established that there is a causal connection between p and q when we have satisfied ourselves
that by manipulating the one factor we can achieve or bring it about that the other is, or is not, there.
We usually satisfy ourselves as to this by making experiments’ (1971: 72). Previous approaches
along similar lines were formulated by Collingwood (1938, 1940) and Gasking (1955). Both of
these views are in line with the general statement of manipulability above. Collingwood builds his
three senses of causation on a presupposition involving the concepts of efficient cause and final
cause: ‘the causa quod  (…) is a situation or state of things believed by the agent in question to
exist’ and ‘the causa ut is a purpose or state of things to be brought about’ (1998, orig. 1940: 292).
Gasking defines causation as follows: ‘A causes B if (…) events of the B sort can be produced by
producing events of the A sort’ (1955: 483).
Concerning  the  overall  framework  for  manipulability,  there  are  two  important  aspects
relevant  for  my  purposes  here  with  respect  to  which  von  Wright's  views  diverge  from  both
Collingwood and Gasking:
a) Causation is discussed in scientific context.
b) There is a connection between causation defined as manipulability and experimentation.
Both (a) and (b) are present in von Wright’s ‘experimentalist idea of causation’ (1971: xiii). 
By comparison, Gasking does not focus on science in particular, and, furthermore, seems to
abide by the view that causal concepts are not used in scientific context:  ‘scientists hardly ever
make use of the notion’ (1955: 486). Collingwood's discussion, however, focuses on causation in
history,  and  is,  thus,  relevant  for  causal  explanation  in  the  sciences.  Nevertheless,  while
Collingwood's  three senses of  causation are traced to  the ‘historical  sense’,  involving an agent
acting such as to achieve a certain goal or motivation (Collingwood, 1998 orig. 1940: 292, 323),
experimentation  is  not  discussed.  Furthermore,  under  a  plausible  interpretation  (Martin,  1998),
sense III, which applies to natural science, is separated from the agent's perspective, and can be
explained through laws. This way of making sense of unmanipulable causes seems to leave out the
advantage of manipulability accounting for the role of experimentation in causal generalizations
emphasized by von Wright. 
There is, however, an important similarity between von Wright's and Collingwood relevant
for  the  discussion  in  section  2:  the  focus  on  methodology.  Both  views  concentrate  on  causal
explanation rather than on causation as an ontological  issue.1 The primacy of the epistemic,  or
methodological aspect is also a feature shared with contemporary approaches to causation such as
the one by Woodward.2 The crucial difference to emphasize is that while Collingwood discusses
philosophical  methodology, and his approach to causation is part  of his project of investigating
metaphysics  through  identifying  absolute  presuppositions,  von  Wright  provides  an  account  of
causation based on experimental methodology. This explains the stronger focus on the scientific
uses of causality on von Wright's view. 
Before comparing von Wright's view to contemporary approaches, I consider its reception
among other manipulability-based views. Woodward (2016, section 2) presents von Wright's (1971)
account as an early version of the agency theory (as in Menzies and Price, 1993). According to
Woodward,  the  biggest  issue  for  both  von Wright  and subsequent  agency  views  is  explaining
nonmanipulable causes. On Woodward's interpretation, von Wright's solution relies on a concept of
1 See D'Oro, 2002 for this interpretation of Collingwood.
2 See Popa, 2016 for a discussion of Collingwood's remarks on methodology alongside contemporary approaches to
causation.
similarity between manipulable and nonmanipulable causes, which is difficult to spell out in non-
causal terms. For instance, the connection between magmatic activity and a volcanic eruption can
be  explained  in  terms  of  a  lower  scale  model  of  volcanic  eruptions  on  which  intervention  is
possible.  Woodward's objection,  against  both von Wright and the agency theory,  would be that
mapping the similarities between the model and the causal influence from the magmatic activity to
the eruption of the volcano would involve other causal relations. It is this particular interpretation of
von Wright that I challenge. My argument aims at establishing that von Wright's theory is in fact
closer to interventionism than to the agency theory, and more compatible with scientific practice
than is reflected in Woodward's (2003, 2016) discussion of early manipulability views. Illari and
Russo (2014: 180-181) also discuss von Wright in the context of action-based theories of causation,
and  thus  in  the  same  category  as  the  agency  theory,  but  at  the  same  time  acknowledge  the
connection to experimentation and scientific practice.3
2. Von Wright on causation and experimentation
From the onset, Von Wright's discussion of causation concentrates on the scientific context. In the
beginning of the chapter  on causation from  Explanation and Understanding,  he states that ‘the
notion of cause which I will be discussing (...) is essentially tied to the idea of action and therefore,
as a scientific notion, to the idea of experiment (1971: 36). This stance is presented as an alternative
to the covering law model of scientific explanation (Hempel, 1965), which deliberately avoids a
notion  of  causation  going  beyond  the  Humean  regularity  view,  due  to  a  set  of  worries  about
metaphysical concepts. Von Wright's point is that causal thinking is necessary for science, in order
to provide a satisfactory account of causal explanation. He further holds that there is an important
relation between causation and experimentation.
Von Wright's subsequent considerations on causal analysis bear an important similarity to
the methodology of controlled experiments. He states that causal analysis within a system is ‘closed
to  causal  influences  from  outside  the  system’  (1971:  54).  Further  specifications  on  how  to
manipulate  causal  relata  include  the notion of  a  final  state  of  a  system brought  about  through
modifications of the anterior states (pp. 60-63). The considerations on interference deserve special
emphasis: for establishing whether a putative causal relation holds between two states in a system
von Wright proposes a test through free action from outside of the system. The description of the
act of interference shares the arrow-breaking feature currently advocated by interventionist views:
Now assume that we change α to a and watch what happens. Assume we find that the system goes
through one of its hypothetically admitted moves from initial state to end-state. The manipulation
described makes possible a very powerful logical conclusion. It is that neither α nor any state which
3 The  connection  between  Woodward's  theory  and  the  action/agency  based  theories  is  also  acknowledged  when
discussing difference-making.
occurred anterior to α can be a sufficient condition of the initial state of the system as instantiated.
A sufficient condition from the past can work only through an uninterrupted chain of successive
sufficient conditions within the system, the initial state of which is that condition occurring in the
past. But any such chain, if there is one, is interrupted at α. Because α, we assumed, will not change
to a unless we change it (von Wright, 1971: 61).
Thus, von Wright's definition of causation through action plays out in an experimental, system-
based setting, which includes the possibility of an exogenous component: ‘in the idea of putting
systems in motion the notions of action and of causation meet’ (p. 64).
I argue that this view is very much analogous to contemporary preoccupations with causality
in  scientific  context,  namely,  with experimental  methodology.  Since my interest  lies  mainly  in
philosophical  aspects,  I  rely  on  Woodward's  view,  although  it  should  be  noted  that  this
methodology was incorporated earlier, in causal modelling approaches, such as Pearl (2000) and
Spirtes et al. (1993). While there are different concepts of causation at work within Woodward's
approach, all of them involve interventions on a system of variables. For instance, the definition of
direct cause goes as follows: ‘a necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a direct cause of Y
with respect to some variable set V is that there be a possible intervention on X that will change Y
(or the probability distribution of Y) when all other variables in V besides X and Y are held fixed at
some value by other independent interventions’ (2003: 55). Woodward's definition of intervention,
inspired by the formal apparatus of Pearl, and Spirtes et al. includes the following conditions:
(M1) I must be the only cause of X; i.e. (…) the intervention must completely disrupt the causal
relationship between X and its previous causes so that the value of X is set entirely by I, 
(M2) I must not directly cause Y via a route that does not go through X (…), 
(M3) I should not itself be caused by any cause that affects Y via a route that does not go through
X, and 
(M4) I leaves the values taken by any causes of Y except those that are on the directed path from I
to X to Y (should this exist) unchanged (Woodward, 2016: section 5).
This way of defining intervention is closely tied to the methodology of controlled experiments. For
instance, when testing a drug, the effects of interventions are compared to the state of a control
group, where the same system operates, but without the state brought about by the administration of
the  drug.  All  the  other  variables  in  the  two  groups  are  left  at  the  same  values.  Woodward’s
discussion  of  the  arrow-breaking  feature  of  interventions  appears  to  echo  von  Wright’s
considerations  above:  ‘the  idea  of  an  intervention  as  an  exogenous  change  that  disrupts  the
mechanism that was previously responsible for the cause event’ functions as ‘to provide C with the
kind of “independent causal history” that allows us to distinguish the effects (if any) of C on E from
the  effects  of  other  “confounding”  variables  on  E’  (Woodward,  2016:  section  9).  Thus,  both
Woodward's talk of variables and interventions and von Wright's discussion of alternating changes
and observations of the subsequent states of the system can account for causality operating in the
example of the drug test.
One issue here is that Woodward's concept of intervention employs causal relations, thus
rendering and the interventionist approach to causation non-reductive. It is not entirely clear that
von Wright can provide a fully reductive account of causation either. While he does not define
manipulation in causal terms, one may consider the changes in the various states of a system to be
of causal nature. Since reduction is beyond the scope of this paper, I do not pursue this issue here. It
will,  however,  be  relevant  for  my  final  remarks  on  the  metaphilosophical  aspects  around  the
causation debate during von Wright's time and now.
As a result of comparing the two views, there are two points to make:
1.  On  both  von Wright's  and  Woodward's  views  the  interventionist/manipulationist  concept  of
causation is defined within a system comprised of causal relata, where causal relations are singled
out through interference with certain states/variables and observation of the other states/variables in
the system.
2. The main use for this setting is experimental – causality is defined through manipulation in a
system that meets the requirements of an ideal controlled experiment which should single out causal
connections. In this sense, both concepts of causation are closely related to causal explanation.
A further important point to make is that while (1) may be read as a theoretical/formal point
on how to connect causation and action, (2) has methodological implications (i.e., it provides a way
of inferring causally). In my view, it is this latter point that brings von Wright's view closer to the
interventionist  concept  of  causation  than  to  the  agency  one.  While  Menzies  and  Price  (1993)
emphasize the role of the agent's free action, in a similar fashion to von Wright, there is no specific
account of how to infer causally in experimental  setting.  That,  of course,  is not to say that the
Menzies-Price concept of causation is not applicable to experiments, but rather, that, unlike the one
by von Wright, it was not designed through this particular framework. Thus, both von Wright's
view and interventionism share the ‘experimentalist’ aims when it comes to defining causation. A
final  point  worth  stressing  is  that  this  analysis  brings  further  evidence  against  the  association
between von Wright’s view and the agency theory on the basis a priority of agency over causality:
von Wright rejects an ontic connection between action and causation, and the conceptual connection
he supports holds from the framework of a model of the kind described above, whose aim does not
go beyond ‘approximating’ the world (1975: pp. 48-54).
3. Von Wright on counterfactuals and unmanipulable causes
The previous  section  focused on the  similarities  between von Wright's  and Woodward's  views
involving  the  connection  between  causation  and  science.  This  section  discusses  the  common
counterfactual  apparatus,  with  emphasis  on  its  use  for  cases  where  human  intervention  is
impossible.  As mentioned,  Woodward interprets  von Wright's  view as an earlier  version of the
agency account, using a version of the principle of analogical reasoning to deal with unmanipulable
causes.  Against  this  interpretation,  I  suggest  that  von  Wright’s  theory,  which  shares  the
counterfacutal setting with contemporary interventionist views, relies on counterfactuals to explain
unmanipulable causes. The counterfactual approach is sketched in Explanation and Understanding
and further developed in Causality and Determinism.
Following up with the definition of causation cited above, von Wright holds that: ‘when we
cannot interfere with p and q we can nevertheless assume that there is a causal bond between them.
This would be tantamount to assuming, e.g., that if we could produce p as a result of action, we
could  also  bring  about  q,  viz.  by  producing  p’  (1971:  72-73).  Here,  the  case  of  variables
unmanipulable by humans is specified. Such cases are not explained through analogy or similarity,
but through a counterfactual scenario – if one could act in such way as to produce the cause, the
effect  would  also  come  about.  Coming  back  to  the  earlier  example,  the  causal  influence  of
magmatic activity on the eruption of a volcano is explained through a counterfactual involving a
potential action: if the magmatic system could be controlled, then there would be corresponding
changes in the volcanic eruption.
In Causality and Determinism this idea is further developed, and von Wright’s view appears
to be a full-fledged counterfactual account, where causal dependence ‘is not directly one between
cause and action, but between the notion of a (causal) counterfactual conditional and action’ (1975:
50). According to this passage, causes are not directly dependent on the possibility of action, but on
the  potential  of  them being brought  about  through action.  An alternative  interpretation  of  this
passage, which I do not pursue here, could go as far as holding that, under this formulation, causal
dependence  comes  down  to  counterfactuals,  rather  than  action.4 Furthermore,  while  the  view
expressed  in  Explanation  and  Understanding may  be  subject  to  debate,  the  further  use  of
counterfactuals to explain unmanipulable causes is clearly stated in  Causality and Determinism:
‘this statement can be made about states of production of which is not within our ability – and the
statement  is  true  or  false  quite  independently  of  whether  we or  anybody else  ever  acquire  the
ability’ (1975: 51).
Woodward's concept of intervention is also counterfactual. Woodward emphasizes this as an
advantage  of  his  view over  both  earlier  manipulability-based approaches  and other  theories  of
causal  explanation.  While  grounding  the  reliability  of  the  counterfactual  approach  to  causal
explanation  in  specific  mathematical  models  for  counterfactuals,  he  explains  the  avoidance  of
counterfactuals by previous philosophers of science through the dismissal of this formal apparatus:
‘many philosophers of science have in turn dismissed treatments of causation and explanation that
rely  on  counterfactuals  as  unclear  or  unscientific,  despite  the  existence  of  a  mathematically
sophisticated literature outside of philosophy that takes just this form’ (2003: 4). On the basis of the
discussion above, I hold that this pattern does not include von Wright’s view. As already pointed
out, despite the worries about causation and counterfactuals expressed by the adepts of the covering
4 In the manner of Lewis, 1973.
law  model,  von  Wright  attributed  causation  an  important  role  in  connection  to  scientific
explanation,  and formulated  a  theory  of  causation  through action  modelled  on  counterfactuals.
Furthermore, while Woodward raises the objection that early action-based theories of causation are
‘linked much too closely to the practical possibility of human manipulation’ (Woodward, 2016:
section 1), I have argued that von Wright’s theory can answer this challenge in a matter similar to
Woodward,  since  his  concept  of  causation,  despite  its  connection  to  human  action,  uses
counterfactuals  to  explain  potential  interventions,  and  not  only  actual  ones:  when  human
intervention  is  impossible,  causal  claims  can  be  spelled  out  in  terms  of  possible  interventions.
Subsequently,  on  Woodward’s  view,  hypothetical  interventions  are  expressed  through
counterfactuals.
An issue to raise here is that, although one may acknowledge von Wright's earlier use of
counterfactuals, and their regimentation in solving the problem of unmanipulable causes, there are
no considerations  on  truth  values  for  counterfactuals  in  von Wright's  work.  By comparison to
Woodward's account, I propose two answers to this worry. One is a  tu quoque counterargument:
although Woodward brings  counterfactuals,  interventions,  and causal  models  together,  it  is  not
entirely  clear  what  his  semantics  for  counterfactuals  is.  While  Woodward's  interpretation  of
counterfactuals matches the formal considerations on causal inference from Pearl (2000), there is
the issue of vicious circularity: intervention is defined in terms of counterfactuals which, in their
turn,  are  understood  through  causal  models.  It  is,  thus,  difficult  to  establish  which  should  be
explained in terms of which (see Rips for this objection).5 Thus, while von Wright's view may be in
need of a model for counterfactuals, Woodward's approach to counterfactuals may not tell as much
about the relation between causation and counterfactuals as may be expected of a counterfactual
theory of causal explanation. The other answer, relating to formal issues regarding the choice of
semantics  for  counterfactuals  (see  Reiss,  2012),  may  turn  the  lack  of  a  particular  model  for
counterfactuals into an advantage for von Wright's view. As Reiss (2012) shows in the context of
social  sciences,6 evidence for causal claims does not always admit interventions in Woodward's
sense (i.e., where a variable is intervened upon independently of its cause) and sometimes one needs
to backtrack.7 If  the only acceptable model  rules  out backtracking,  then interventionism cannot
account  for  evidence  acquired  in  this  manner.  However,  if  no  particular  understanding  of
counterfactuals  is  written  into  the  definition  of  causation,  then  the  ‘experimentalist  idea  of
causation’ can admit of several models for counterfactuals working in causal contexts, and, thus,
5 It appears to be the case that causal relations are more fundamental than counterfactuals (which is the case for Pearl's
models). This would make it difficult to defend a claim that causal connections presuppose a kind of counterfactual
dependence.
6 The example  from the social  sciences  may not  be ideal,  since  von Wright  does not  aim to account  for  causal
explanation in this area. The point of having several models for counterfactuals at work may be extended, however, for
instance, to psychology (see Gerstenberg et al.).
7 One of the goals discussed by Reiss involves using backtracking when one aims ‘to keep as much as possible about
historical actors’ situations and dispositions intact’ (p. 162).
incorporate several kinds of evidence for causal explanations. While connecting this to the issue of
evidence would require more work on von Wright's proposed theory, my point here is that, in its
current form, his approach leaves the option of using several types of evidence open.
Concerning the place of von Wright's view among the interventionist and agency theories,
once again, von Wright's view proves to be closer to interventionism than to the agency theory. As
argued,  there  is  evidence  for  interpreting  von  Wright's  view  as  employing  counterfactuals  to
account for causal dependencies, in a manner similar to Woodward. Subsequently, on his view,
causation is not entirely dependent on the possibility of human action,  and, furthermore, with a
written-in counterfactual account for unmanipulable causes, there is no need to solve the issue of
defining similarity or analogy in non-causal terms.
4. Manipulability old and new
Given the similarities between von Wright's theory and current manipulability approaches, along
with the recent success of the latter, a final issue to settle is why von Wright's approach to causation
has  not  gained  a  more  significant  impact  in  the  philosophy of  science  thus  far.  If  my  earlier
considerations are right, the issue does not concern unmanipulable causes, since the counterfactual
solution (if indeed it is taken to be better than the analogy one, as Woodward holds) was already
available for von Wright. Relying on metaphilosophical considerations on what a theory of causal
explanation was expected to achieve, I suggest two potential explanations, relating to the problem
of reduction and the scope of the manipulationist concept of causation.
With regard to reduction, as pointed out above, the issue is whether one can completely
avoid the employment of causal terms while making use of closed systems, where changes in final
states are brought about through manipulating earlier  states. At the time when von Wright was
articulating  his  theory,  providing  a  reductive  account  of  causation  held  considerably  more
importance than at present. For this, an analogy with Weatherson's (2014: section 5.2) discussion of
Lewis' theory is illustrative – Lewis's counterfactual account of causation faced objections from
different sides, the adepts of reductive approaches in the 1970s, and the defenders of non-reductive
approaches in the 2000s. Thus, if there is a worry about failing to provide a fully reductive account
of  causation  as  manipulability,  this  charge  would  have  been  more  severe  during  the  time  of
Explanation and Understanding and Causality and Determinism than when Making Things Happen
was written.
With respect to the scope of the manipulationist concept of causation, von Wright openly
states the limitations of his view in the context of different sciences: ‘the idea of experimentalist or
manipulative  causation  has  important  applications  in  the  natural  sciences—and  also  (...)  its
applicability becomes debatable when we move to the human (including the social) sciences’ (von
Wright, 1975: 58). Once again, given the focus on a reductive, one-size-fits-all concept of causation
characteristic of the time, the narrow scope of von Wright’s view was more likely to count as a
flaw, with broader projects achieving more acceptance. In contemporary context, this view appears
to have shifted, with wider acceptance of domain-specific causal concepts. Despite the different
motivation behind von Writght’s original views, on the one hand, and causal pluralism, on the other
hand, this opens new ways of connecting von Wright’s view to a plurality of caual concepts. For
instance,  Illari  and Russo (2014: 181) suggest that  von Wright's  view can be integrated  within
causal pluralism. Admitting that the manipulationist concept of causation may be better suited for
certain areas while its effectiveness may be limited in others can be coalesced with the claim that
different concepts of causation could work for different sciences. The latter idea, as one of the main
statements  of  causal  pluralism  (Hall,  2004;  Godfrey-Smith,  2010),  gained  plausibility  later  on,
possibly owing to the failed attempts to defend a concept of causation encompassing uses across
different scientific fields. This connection can be further supported by von Wright’s claim that ‘we
may (...) distinguish types of causation and say that causation in the natural sciences is primarily of
the manipulative type, whereas in the human sciences another type (or other types) of causation and
of  causal  explanation  are  prominent’  (1975:  58).  Another  point  to  make  in  relation  to  the
comparison with Woodward's view is that while von Wright admitted the limited applicability of
his concept of causation, Woodward aims at extending the area of applicability for interventionism
as far as possible. While this opens the floor for further objections, such as the above mentioned
criticism by Reiss's (2012) about the use of the interventionist interpretation of counterfactuals for
causal  explanations  in  the social  sciences,  a  tension should be noted.  Although recently  causal
pluralism appears as an acceptable position to take, specific accounts of causation (in particular
manipulability and mechanistic views)8 aim to account for as many uses of causal claims as possible
(and thus, to go beyond pluralism). Since von Wright’s view does not share these aims, it would be
a better fit for a pluralist setting.
To sum up, if theories of causation were expected to provide reductive accounts and cover
all the uses of causal claims, von Wright's view may have had two serious shortcomings at the time
it was put together. This may have prevented his view from gaining wider application to the domain
of scientific  explanation,  and,  consequently,  led to the two important  features  discussed in this
paper  -  the  connection  between  causation  and  experimentation,  along  with  the  use  of
counterfactuals  -  going  unexplored.  I  take  this  to  further  emphasize  the  need  to  reassess  von
Wright's view on causation given the points it shares with the present debates in the field, and the
changes in assumptions of what theories of causal explanation should fulfill.
5. Conclusions
I argued that von Wright's account of causation shares two important features with contemporary
approaches  to  causation.  The  former,  methodologically-oriented  one,  concerns  the  connection
8 See Psillos, 2003, for instance.
between causation, action, and experimentation, linking causation and action within the workings of
a system. The latter regards von Wright's employment of the counterfactual interpretation of closed
systems  and  exogenous  interventions  to  answer  one  of  the  main  difficulties  of  manipulability
theories - explaining unmanipulable causes. Both of these features are found in a more elaborated
and technical version in Woodward's approach, while von Wright's work is commonly considered
as a precursor of the contemporary agency theories, through the connection between causation and
action.  My arguments show that there is more than relating causation to action that makes von
Wright's  view  relevant  for  recent  debates  on  causation,  and  that  in  von  Wright's  work  this
connection is spelled out in ways common to the contemporary literature on causation and causal
inference (reliant on the system approach and counterfactuals).
These  findings  are  firstly  important  from  a  history  of  philosophy  perspective,  as  von
Wright's insights into the methodology of controlled experiments, counterfactuals, and his proposed
solution to the problem of unmanipulable causes are not fully reflected in the present discussion
around  the  history  of  manipulability-based  approaches  to  causation.  I  hold  that,  through  these
features, von Wright's view proves to be closer to Woodward's manipulability approach than to the
agency  theory.  Secondly,  there  are  aspects  of  von  Wright's  theory  that  can  shed  light  on
contemporary debates around manipulability. Buzzoni's (2015) defence of an action-based approach
to causation against the charge of anthropomorphism on the basis of von Wright's original account
is illustrative in this sense. I take these uses of von Wright's theory to be enabled, at least in part, by
the features pointed out above, common with contemporary approaches to causation.
Von Wright's view on causation, proves, thus, to be an important connection point between
theories  of  causation  grounded  in  action  and  causal  generalizations  in  the  sciences.  While  its
potential  employment  in  solving  current  problems  related  to  causation  would  require  further
adjustment and elaboration, I have pointed out that von Wright's view is in line with the main goals
of contemporary theories.
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